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Abstract. A one-dimensional model of spatial political competition with
endogenous party formation is developed. It is proved that at equilibrium
there are only two parties. These parties propose alternatives in the extreme
positions of the policy space. The adopted policy, however, is a compromise
between these two extremes.
1 Introduction
The spatial framework first suggested by Hotelling (1929) to model political
competition has provided a set of important results and insights. The best
known of these results is the ‘‘principle of minimum dierentiation.’’ During
the last two decades many modifications of the original Hotelling model have
been developed. The basic insight, however, is still widely accepted: parties
have strong incentives to converge in their proposed policies. The best proof
of this is the extended use of the median voter theorem in many recent papers
on Political Economy.
An essential assumption in this literature is that the party that obtains
more than half of the total number of votes has the power to implement its
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announced policy. Recently, some authors have challenged this assumption.
Alesina and Rosenthal [1] develop a model of political spatial competition
with the distinctive feature that the implemented policy is the result of a
compromise between the President and the Congress. Even though most of
their work concentrates on the US system, they also claim that the outcome
of the political competition in parliamentary countries can generally be seen
as a compromise between the dierent political forces. One of the main
conclusions here is that in equilibrium parties’ policies do not converge.
Moreover, it may be the case that parties adopt very radical policies. The
authors also provide empirical evidence of party polarization in the USA.
Ortuno-Ortin [7] studies the existence of an equilibrium in a model in which
the outcome of the game also depends on the distribution of votes among the
two parties.
In the present paper we also take the view that democratic institutions
achieve a ‘‘compromise’’ between all the political proposals. We capture this
idea by assuming a spatial model in which the implemented policy is a
weighted convex combination of all the proposed policies. The weights will
depend on the distribution of votes among the proposals. Dierent demo-
cratic institutions and societies will translate votes into weights in dierent
ways. One example would be Proportional Representation under which
each proposal gets a weight proportional to the share of votes that it re-
ceived. Our analysis, however, allows for very general ways to calculate such
weights. Thus, we also consider ‘‘weight functions’’ in which, for example,
the proposal that gets more than half of the votes obtains a very large
weight and proposals with a small share of the votes get an arbitrarily small
weight.
We do not provide a theory about the way votes are translated into
weights. But we will be general enough to be able to capture many possible
scenarios. For example, we could see the implemented policy as the result of
some bargaining process among dierent parties, each of them defending its
announced policy. The bargaining power of each party may depend on the
distribution of votes. In this case the implemented policy can be seen as a
combination of the dierent proposals.
We will impose, however, two main restrictions on the allowed weight
functions: continuity and superadditivity. The first one implies that the
weights associated with the proposals change in a continuous way with
respect to the distribution of votes. Thus, institutions in which ‘‘the winner
takes all’’ are not considered here. The second restriction, superadditivity, is
weaker. Say that one proposal gets weight w1 and a second gets w2. Then, if
all the agents that support these two proposals would agree to vote for only
one proposal, the weight of this proposal would be at least w1  w2.
We take the ‘‘compromise’’ approach to political competition to in-
vestigate the endogenous formation of parties or coalitions. Any element of
the feasible policy space (which is exogenously given) can be a political
proposal. Parties can be seen as coalitions of agents putting forward specific
proposals. At equilibrium there is no coalition of agents such that if they
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change strategies and vote for dierent proposals none of them is worse o
and at least one of them is better o. Thus, our equilibrium concept will be
strong Nash.
The paper shows that if the policy space is a one-dimensional interval
there exists a unique strong Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium is such that
the population is divided into two sets and all agents in one of them vote for
the smallest policy in the interval and all the other agents vote for the greatest
policy in the interval. The interpretation is that in the one-dimensional case
there is only ‘‘room’’ for two parties. Furthermore, parties are polarized (but
the implemented policy is not). The intuition is clear; the implemented policy
must be a compromise among the dierent proposals (convex combination
of the policies that obtained some votes). If there were, say, three proposals
the ‘‘compromise’’ policy could be moved in the desired direction by two of
the coalitions joining forces together. Moreover, voting for a radical policy
also moves the compromise in that direction.
This extreme polarization of the equilibrium proposals may be criticized
as very unrealistic. Notice, however, that the policy space was exogenously
given and it might be the case that the end points of such space are not, in
reality, too radical. For example, imagine that the policy space is the interval
[0, 1] which represents possible income taxation policies. Then the point 0
could be understood as the lowest possible taxation level that can realistically
be proposed (this normally changes with time), say 10%. The point 1 could
be seen, for example, as an average taxation level of 60%
In any case, our results emphasize the incentives to make radical pro-
posals and this is in contrast to the standard Hotelling approach which
isolates the incentives to become moderate. Reality is, no doubt, much more
complex and the incorporation of elements such as asymmetric information,
costs of party or coalition formation, interest groups, and so on would in-
troduce new forces and incentives which could give a more realistic picture of
political competition.
Fedderson [3] also considers a model of party formation. Here, however,
the policy that receives most votes wins (and is implemented). Voting is
costly and each agent may stay home or vote for any policy. The number of
agents is finite so that each of them might be pivotal. It is shown that in any
Nash equilibrium at most two policies obtain votes. Thus, even though this
result resembles the one in our model, the dierences are important. No
agent has ‘‘positive mass’’ in our model and we show existence of a unique
strong Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, the outcome of the game does not
coincide with the proposal of the winner. The intuition behind the results in
Feddersen is, consequently, completely dierent from the ones in our model.
It should also be mentioned that the results in Greenberg and Weber [4], [5],
and Le Breton and Weber [2] do not apply to our model. These authors
consider some problems of stable coalition structures and the equilibrium
concepts are similar to the ones in this paper. The models are, however, quite
dierent. In their case each possible coalition of agents has a set of achievable
alternatives. They can implement one of those alternatives regardless of what
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other coalitions do. In our case one alternative is implemented and coalitions
smaller than the grand coalition only have partial influence in choosing this
alternative.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets up
the basic model. The main results of the paper are presented in Section 3.
Section 4 concludes and discusses some modifications of the model.
2 The voting game
Let B denote the set of Borel sets in [0, 1] and let k denote the Lebesgue
measure onB. For A  0; 1 let Ac denote the complement of A in 0; 1. Let
R  fx 2 Rjx  0g.
We assume that the set of agents’ type is the interval [0, 1]. A set A 2 B is
called a coalition of types. The distribution of types is described by a mea-
surable function f : 0; 1 ! R; such that
R 1
0 f dk  1. The policy space is
given by the set 0; 1 [ fÿ1g. The element fÿ1g in the policy space can be
seen as representing a very bad outcome for cases of ‘‘total disagreement.’’ It
is only needed for technical reasons since we want to exclude those cases in
which agents form non-measurable coalitions.1
Agents have preferences over the policy space. The preferences of an
agent of type x are represented by ux : 0; 1 [ fÿ1g ! R [ fÿ1g, where
uxÿ1  ÿ1; ux is single-peaked, and uxx > uxy  0 8y 2 0; 1; y 6 x.
Thus, x is the ideal policy for an agent of type x. Society will have to choose a
unique policy from the policy space. In order to do that each agent will
announce an element of this space. Thus, Sx  0; 1 is the strategy space of
type x; x 2 0; 1, and we interpret sx 2 Sx as type x voting for policy sx. We
define S  Qx20; 1 Sx:
Before defining the game form used for choosing a policy we need some
additional definitions. Let m be the measure on B that has density f with
respect to k :
mA 
Z
A
f dk A 2 B:
Thus, mA can be understood as the ‘‘size’’ of coalition A. Given s 2 S and
c 2 0; 1 the coalition of types voting for c is given by
Asc  fx 2 0; 1 j sx  cg:
Definition 2.1 s 2 S is called admissible if Asc 2 B 8 c 2 0; 1.
1Readers who are not interested in these technical details can think of the policy space
as being the interval [0, 1].
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Given the admissible strategy profile s the set of relevant proposals Cs is
defined by
Cs  fc 2 0; 1 j mAsc > 0g :
Observe that Cs is countable. Let
W  fwnn j 0  wn  1 n 2 N;
X
n
wn  1g :
If s 2 S is admissible then clearly mAscc2Cs 2 W 2. The influence or weight
each candidate will have in the determination of the adopted policy depends
on the size of the coalition voting for it. The weights, however, do not need to
be proportional to the size of the coalitions. For this purpose we define a
weight function g : W ! W . We write gw  gnwn w 2 W .
We impose the following assumptions on the weight function g.
A.1 (Anonymity)
Let w  wnn 2 W and let p : N! N be one-to-one and onto. Let w0 2 W
be defined by w0pn  wnn 2 N. Then
gpnw0  gnw n 2 N:
A.2 (Zero-Property)
Let w  wnn 2 W : Then
g1w  0, w1  0:
A.3 (Superadditivity)
Let w  wnn 2 W . Define w0 2 W by w01  w1; w02 
P1
n2 wn; w
0
n  0
n  3. Then
g2w0 
X1
n2
gnw:
Before stating assumption (A.4) we define a metric d on W by
dw;w0  sup
n
jwn ÿ w0nj w;w0 2 W :3
For wmm  W and w 2 W we write wm ! w if wmm converges to w with
respect to the metric d.
A.4 (Continuity)
Let wmm  W and w 2 W . If wm ! w then gwm ! gw.
(A.1) is a standard anonymity assumption. (A.2) just states that candi-
dates have an influence on the determination of the outcome if and only if
they receive votes from a set of agents with positive measure. Assumption
(A.3) is a form of (weak) increasing returns to the number of votes. Notice
2 If Cs  c1;    ; cn is finite we identify mAscc2Cs with the sequencemAsc1; mAsc2; . . . ; mAscn; 0; . . . 2 W .
3d is the standard metric in the space l1.
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that Proportional Representation satisfies this assumption. (A.4) is the most
restrictive assumption. It imposes continuity on g and, therefore, rules out
games in which the ‘‘winner takes all.’’
In the case of only two coalitions it is natural to require that g is
monotonic, i.e. the largest coalition obtains a greater weight. Even though we
have not imposed monotonicity it directly follows from assumptions (A.1),
(A.2) and (A.3).
Definition 2.2 Let w  w1;w2; 0; . . .;w0  w01;w02; 0; . . . 2 W : g : W ! W is
monotonic if
w1  w01 ) g1w  g1w0:
Lemma 2.3 Let g : W ! W obey assumptions (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3). Then g is
monotonic.
Proof: Let   0 and w  w1;w2; 0; . . .;w0  w1  ;w2 ÿ ; 0; . . .,
w00  w1; w2 ÿ ; ; 0; . . . 2 W . By assumptions (A.1) and (A.3)
g1w00  g3w00  g1w0. This implies g1w00  g1w0. Also, by assumption
(A.3) g2w00  g3w00  g2w. Therefore, by assumption (A.2)
1ÿ g1w00  1ÿ g1w. It follows that g1w  g1w00  g1w0.
q.e.d.
Now we can specify the outcome function F : S ! 0; 1 [ fÿ1g that de-
scribes how society chooses a policy. For all s 2 S let
F s 
P
c2Cs c gcmAscc2Cs , if s is admissibleÿ1 , otherwise

:
F is well defined since Cs is countable for any admissible strategy s 2 S. Since
g has the zero-property the outcome is given by the convex combination of
the relevant proposals where the weights of each proposal are determined by
g. An important special case would be Proportional Representation. In this
case g is the identity function: the weight a candidate obtains is identical to
the proportion of agents who vote for it.
Given s 2 S the payo for type x is given by uxF s.
Definition 2.4 A voting game is given by
C  f ; S; uxx20;1; g; F
 
:
Definition 2.5 s 2 S is a strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) of the voting game C if
there exists no D 2 B and s0 2 S such that s0x  sx 8 x j2 D and
uxF s0  uxF s 8 x 2 D
and uxF s0 > uxF s for at least one x 2 D:
Notice that our definition of SNE allows for deviations where only a set
of agents with measure zero ends up better o. This is clearly a very weak
requirement and therefore the equilibrium concept is strong.
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3 The main results
The following proposition is a well known result from measure theory (see
for example [6], Theorem B, p. 125).
Proposition 3.1 A finite measure m on a r-algebra B is absolutely continuous
with respect to a measure l on B i 8 > 0 9d > 0 such that
lA < d) mA <  A 2 B :
The following lemma shows that there exists a strategy profile s^ such that
the outcome of the game coincides with the ideal policy of the ‘‘dividing
type.’’ Any type who is to the left (right) of x^ votes for 0 (1).
Lemma 3.2 Let C  ÿf ; S; uxx20;1; g; F  be a voting game and let g obey the
assumptions (A.1) – (A.4). Then there exists a unique x^ 2 0; 1 such that for
s^ 2 S defined by s^y  0 y  x^, s^y  1 y > x^ it is true that
F s^  x^ :
Proof: By Proposition 3.1
m0; x 
Z
0;x
fdk
is continuous as a function of x; x 2 0; 1. Therefore, and by the continuity
of g, the function h : 0; 1 ! 0; 1 defined by hx : g1m0; x; 1ÿ m0; x
x 2 0; 1 is continuous. By assumption (A.2) we have h0  1, h1  0.
By monotonicity of g1 the function h has a unique fixed point x^. Hence,
F s^  0  g0m0; x^; 1ÿ m0; x^  1  g1 m0; x^; 1ÿ m0; x^  x^ :
q.e.d.
We can now provide the main result of the paper. It basically states that s^
is the only SNE in our voting game. Thus, in the one-dimensional case there
is only ‘‘room’’ for two coalitions (parties). Notice that, in general, the equi-
librium outcome x^ coincides with neither the median nor the mean type.
Theorem 3.3 Let C  ÿf ; S; uxx20;1; g; F  be a voting game and let g obey
the conditions (A.1)–(A.4). Let s^ and x^ be the strategy and type defined in
Lemma 3.2. Then s^ is a SNE of the voting game C.Moreover, s^ is unique in the
sense that there exists no SNE s 2 S such that F s 6 F s^ and if s is a SNE
and F s  F s^ then m Asc
ÿ   0 for all c 2 Cs such that c j2 f0; 1g.
Proof. I s^ is a SNE for C.
Observe that no coalition containing types voting for 0 and types voting for 1
can improve by deviating from s^. If for example one member x  x^  F s^ of
such a coalition is better o after the deviation all agents x with x > x^ must be
worse o. Therefore, we only need to consider the case where a coalition
D  0; x^ deviates. (The proof for D  x^; 1 is similar.) Let s 2 S be such
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that sy  s^y y 2 Dc. We will show that D cannot improve by switching to s.
If s is not admissible we are done since the outcome would be ÿ1 which is
worse for all y 2 D. Therefore, let s be admissible. Then
F s 
X
c2Cs
c gc mAscc2Cs
 
 1  g1 mAscc2Cs
 
 1ÿ
X
1 6c2Cs
gc mAscc2Cs
 
 1ÿ g01ÿ mAs1; mAs1
 g1 1ÿ mAs1; mAs1
 g1 m0; x^; 1ÿ m0; x^
 F s^
by superadditivity and monotonicity of g. (Observe that x^; 1  As1:
Therefore, uyF s  uyF s^ y 2 D which proves that s^ is a SNE.
II. s^ is the unique SNE for C.
Assume first that s is a SNE such that F s 6 F s^. If F s  ÿ1 then
switching to s^ would improve all types, which is a contradiction. W.l.o.g. let
ÿ1 6 F s < F s^. For x 2 0; 1 define the strategy sx 2 S by sxy  1 y  x,
sxy  sy y < x. By Proposition 3.1 and by continuity of g the outcome F sx
is continuous in x. Therefore, there are two cases.
Case (a): 9x  x^ such that F sx  x.
But then coalition x; 1 could improve upon s by sx since F s < F s^ 
x^  x  F sx. Therefore, s is no SNE Contradiction.
Case (b): x > F sx for all x  x^.
Then
F sx^ 
X
c2Csx
c gc

m

As
x
c

c2Csx
 
 1  g1

m

As
x
c

c2Csx
 
 1ÿ
X
1 6c2Csx
gc

m

Asc

c2Csx
 
 1ÿ g01ÿ m

As
x
1

; m

As
x
1

 g1 m0; x^; 1ÿ m0; x^
 F s^  x^
by superadditivity and monotonicity of g which is a contradiction to
x^ > F sx^.
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Assume now that s 2 S is a SNE with F s  F s^ and that 9c 2 Cs,
0 6 c 6 1; such that mAsc > 0. W.l.o.g. let mAsc \ 0; x^ > 0. For x 2 0; 1
define the strategy sx 2 S by sxy  1 y  x, sxy  sy y < x. As before the
outcome F sx is continuous in x. By (A.2)
gc

m

As
x
c

c2Csx
 
> 0 for all x  x^ ;
which implies that
F sx^ 
X
c2Csx
c gc

m

As
x
c

c2Csx
 
> 1  g1

m

As
x
c

c2Csx
 
 1ÿ
X
1 6c2Csx
gc

m

As
x
c

c2Csx
 
 1ÿ g0

1ÿ m

As
x
1

; m

As
x
1

 g1 1ÿ m Asx1
 
; m As
x
1
  
 g1 m0; x^; 1ÿ m0; x^
 F s^  x^
by superadditivity and monotonicity of g. Since F sx is continuous in x there
are again two cases.
Case (a): 9x > x^ such that F sx  x.
then F sx  x > x^  F s^  F s and coalition x; 1 can improve upon s by
sx. Therefore, s is no SNE which is a contradiction.
Case (b): x > F sx for all x > x^.
But then by continuity also x^  F sx^. This contradiction proves the theorem.
q.e.d.
4 Conclusions
We have provided a model of endogenous party formation in which there are
only two parties in equilibrium. These parties propose candidates in extreme
positions of the policy space. The adopted policy, however, is a compromise
between these two extremes.
The two key assumptions in the model are: (i) the weight function is
continuous; (ii) the policy space is one-dimensional and atomless. Our main
result does not generalize to the case of a measure space with atoms. The
reason is that in the presence of atoms the outcome is not a continuous
function of the strategies. Thus, in general, the polarized strategies in the
theorem do not form a strong Nash equilibrium. As an example, consider the
case of a distribution of voters given by three atoms of equal mass such that
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one of them is at point 1/2 and the other two are located at the extremes of
the policy space. It is not dicult to see that at the unique Nash equilibrium
each type votes for her ideal policy and so there is no polarization of agents
strategies. Obviously, if we allow types to use mixed strategies we retain
continuity of the outcome function and therefore a smooth partition of the
electorate in two parties each oering an extreme proposal. In this case,
existence and uniqueness of a polarized SNE follow from exactly the same
arguments used in the proof of the theorem.
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